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IMPOSITION ETHICS — Canonical Specification v1.2 

Status: Locked / Authoritative 
Author, Owner, and Originator: Tom Jump 
Date: Canon sealed at v1.2 

STATUS OF THIS DOCUMENT 

This document constitutes the frozen canon of Imposition Ethics. 
All principles designated as canonical are authoritative. 

Content explicitly labeled Provisional is non-canonical, subordinate to canon, and subject to revision or retraction based on future scientific progress. 

No provisional content overrides canonical principles. 

 

Foundational Principles 

1. Core Axiom (Imposition Principle) 

All involuntary imposition on the will of a conscious agent is immoral. 

All voluntary assitance of the will of a conscious agent is moral. 

 

DEFINITIONS 

Involuntary Imposition 
Any state or action that frustrates, constrains, or overrides the will of a conscious agent without that agent’s consent. 

Will 
The preferences, intentions, or volitional states of a conscious agent. 

Consent 
Voluntary authorization by a conscious agent, free of coercion or overriding influence. 

Conscious Agent 
An entity capable of having a will. 

 

Purpose of Morality 

The function of morality is the systematic reduction of involuntary imposition across conscious agents. Attempting to move the world closer to the Best of all Possible Worlds (BPW), a world with no involuntary imposition of will. 

 

 

2. Consent Principle 

An interaction is morally permissible only when participation is voluntary and free from coercion, manipulation, or override. 

 

3. Conscious Agent Principle 

Moral evaluation applies wherever a conscious agent capable of having a will is affected. 

 

Moral Structure Principles 

A state may be morally negative without any agent being blameworthy. 

 

4. Moral Valence Principle 

Moral valence attaches to states of affairs based on whether involuntary imposition occurs. Moral valence concerns whether a state involves involuntary imposition. 

 

5. Moral Blame Separation Principle 

Moral blame applies only to agents capable of choice and responsibility and is distinct from moral valence. 

 

6. Nature Valence Principle 

States produced by nature may have negative moral valence without any agent being morally blameworthy. 

 

Unavoidability and Comparison 

7. Unavoidability Non-Justification Principle 

The unavoidability of an involuntary imposition does not render it moral. 

 

8. Comparative Imposition Principle 

When involuntary imposition cannot be avoided, immoral states are morally ranked by the degree of will-frustration imposed. 

 

9. Non-Conversion Principle 

Comparative ranking never converts an immoral state into a moral one. 

 

Prevention and Reduction 

10. Prevention Without Override Principle 

Preventing a future involuntary imposition is not itself an imposition when it does not override an existing will. 

 

11. Directional Moral Improvement Principle 

Moral improvement consists in movement toward reduced involuntary imposition, even when moral perfection is unattainable. 

 

12. Reduction Priority Principle 

Where reduction of involuntary imposition is possible without creating new imposition, such reduction is morally preferable. 

 

Modal and Existential Principles 

13. World-Dependence of Imposition Principle (BPW) 

Involuntary imposition is a contingent feature of immoral worlds and is not a necessary condition of conscious existence. 

 

14. Best Possible World Principle 

A world in which conscious agents exist without involuntary imposition is conceptually coherent and defines the moral horizon. 

 

Agency, Communication, and Existence 

15. Non-Obligation of Expression Principle 

No agent is morally obligated to use their body, speech, or actions to satisfy another’s preferences; lying is not inherently immoral. 

 

16. Non-Imposition of Existence Principle 

Birth is not immoral, as no pre-existing will exists to be imposed upon. 

 

Epistemic and Procedural Principles 

17. Moral Fidelity and Epistemic Humility Principle 

Where full formalization would require unjustified assumptions, moral fidelity takes precedence over algorithmic completeness; principled judgment is required under epistemic limits. 

 

Restorative Principle 

18. Absolution Through Acknowledgment Principle 

Absolution consists in the sincere acknowledgment of an immoral act and a request for forgiveness. Absolution does not negate, erase, omit, or reclassify the immoral act itself; it concerns moral blame and relational repair, not moral valence. 

 

19. Objective–Subjective Distinction Principle (Non-Prescriptive Morality) 

Objective morality identifies the ideal moral standard independent of any agent’s limitations; it does not generate obligations, commands, or action-imperatives. Subjective moral action consists only in approximating the objective standard as closely as possible given one’s constraints, without converting moral evaluation into coercive prescription. 

Clarifications (canonical intent): 

• Moral truth is descriptive, not imperative. 

• “Less immoral” does not entail “morally required.” 

• The absence of an objectively perfect option does not create a duty to act. 

• Moral evaluation precedes, but does not compel, action. 

• Moral obligation is not produced by the framework itself. 

This principle formalizes the rejection of “ought implies can” as a basis for objective morality and preserves the separation between: 

• moral valence (what is morally ideal), and 

• agent behavior (what is possible or chosen under constraint). 

 

 

20. Total Moral Tragicness Principle 

Total moral tragicness refers to the degree to which a situation necessarily contains unavoidable involuntary imposition, such that every available option remains morally immoral. Comparative ranking may identify less immoral outcomes, but it does not eliminate the moral tragedy of the situation. 

Clarifications (canonical intent): 

• Total moral tragicness applies only where no available alternative avoids involuntary imposition. 

• A situation may be morally tragic even when agents act optimally under constraint. 

• Comparative judgment does not convert immorality into morality. 

• Total moral tragicness concerns the structure of the situation, not moral blame. 

• Absolution or forgiveness does not erase moral tragicness; it addresses only blame or relational repair. 

 

21. Is–Ought Dissolution Principle 

Moral facts are descriptive, not prescriptive. What makes a state of affairs moral or immoral is independent of any obligation to act. “Oughtness” does not arise from moral facts themselves, but is a contingent, anthropocentric response that follows moral evaluation rather than being intrinsic to it. 

Clarifications (canonical intent): 

• Moral reality identifies what is morally the case, not what agents must do. 

• No logical inference from is to ought is required or permitted. 

• Prescriptions and obligations are not fundamental features of morality. 

• Moral evaluation precedes, but does not entail, action-guiding commands. 

• Feelings of moral obligation reflect perceived agency and social influence, not the essence of morality itself. 

 

22. Refined Non-Prescriptive Action Orientation Principle 

Imposition Ethics provides action guidance in the form of evaluative and orientational structure, not prescriptive commands or obligations. The framework guides agents and institutions by identifying morally relevant features of situations, comparatively ranking states of affairs by degree of involuntary imposition, and delineating constraints on moral justification, without determining or requiring any specific action. 

Action guidance within the framework consists in clarifying: 

• which features of a situation are morally salient, 

• how available options compare in degree of will-frustration, 

• which moral claims are prohibited (e.g., justification, sanctification, obligation), 

• and how agents may voluntarily orient their choices under constraint. 

The absence of determinate prescriptions reflects moral reality under tragic or epistemically limited conditions rather than incompleteness of the framework. Moral evaluation informs action without compelling it. 

Clarifications (canonical intent): 

• Guidance is informational and orientational, not mandatory. 

• Comparative ranking aids deliberation without generating duty. 

• Lack of a single “correct action” does not imply lack of moral structure. 

• Prescriptive certainty is rejected where it would require moral distortion. 

• Voluntary alignment with moral evaluation is permitted but never required. 

 

 

Coordination & Actionability Extension (CAE) 

 

23. Voluntary Adoption Principle 

Agents may freely and reversibly adopt self-imposed behavioral constraints or moral postures aimed at reducing involuntary imposition, without such adoption generating moral obligations for themselves or others. 

Clarifications (canonical intent): 

• Adoption is an expression of alignment, not duty. 

• Constraints are binding only by continued consent. 

• Revocation of adoption carries no moral blame. 

 

24. Moral Posture Declaration Principle 

An agent may publicly declare a moral posture (e.g., imposition minimization, consent prioritization) to signal intent and facilitate voluntary coordination, without implying moral superiority or obligation. 

Clarifications: 

• Declarations function as coordination signals, not commitments enforceable by others. 

• Misalignment between posture and action does not retroactively impose obligation. 

 

25. Heuristic Orientation Principle 

Agents may employ defeasible heuristics that approximate movement toward reduced involuntary imposition where full moral evaluation is impractical, without such heuristics constituting moral rules. 

Clarifications: 

• Heuristics are context-sensitive and revisable. 

• Heuristic failure does not convert action into moral wrongdoing beyond existing imposition. 

 

26. Consent-Presumption Heuristic 

In conditions of epistemic uncertainty regarding consent, agents aligned with imposition reduction may voluntarily presume non-consent until consent is reasonably established. 

Clarifications: 

• This presumption is prudential, not obligatory. 

• The heuristic may be overridden by contextual factors without moral breach. 

 

27. Least-Frustration Heuristic 

Where involuntary imposition is unavoidable, agents may voluntarily orient toward options that comparatively minimize the degree, scope, or intensity of will-frustration. 

Clarifications: 

• This heuristic does not justify the imposition. 

• Comparative minimization does not convert immorality into morality. 

 

28. Reversibility Preference Heuristic 

Agents may voluntarily prefer actions that preserve future consent possibilities and minimize irreversible will-frustration. 

Clarifications: 

• Preference does not entail obligation. 

• Irreversibility alone does not determine moral valence. 

 

29. Moral Tragedy Recognition Principle 

Agents and institutions may explicitly recognize and name situations in which all available options involve involuntary imposition, without reframing any option as morally justified. 

Clarifications: 

• Recognition does not assign moral blame. 

• Naming tragedy prevents moral laundering and false justification. 

 

30. Legitimacy Without Moral Justification Principle 

Actions or policies may be socially legitimate for coordination, safety, or stability purposes even when morally immoral, provided their involuntary imposition is minimized and openly acknowledged. 

Clarifications: 

• Legitimacy concerns coordination, not moral goodness. 

• Moral evaluation remains unchanged by legitimacy. 

 

31. Institutional Imposition-Reduction Principle 

Institutions may voluntarily adopt structural aims, metrics, or design features intended to reduce involuntary imposition over time, without claiming moral authority or justification. 

Clarifications: 

• Institutional goals are engineering-oriented, not moral mandates. 

• Reduction may be partial, incremental, and imperfect. 

 

32. Exit and Appeal Facilitation Principle 

Institutions aligned with imposition reduction may voluntarily prioritize low exit costs, appealability, and revision mechanisms to preserve agent autonomy under constraint. 

Clarifications: 

• Facilitation does not guarantee consent. 

• Structural constraints may remain morally tragic despite mitigation. 

 

33. Moral Transparency Principle 

No involuntary imposition may be truthfully described as morally good, justified, or right solely by virtue of necessity, authority, or beneficial outcome. 

Clarifications: 

• Transparency applies to language and framing. 

• Beneficial consequences do not negate imposition. 

 

34. Acknowledgment and Repair Orientation Principle 

Agents or institutions responsible for involuntary imposition may engage in acknowledgment and relational repair without reclassifying the imposition as morally permissible. 

Clarifications: 

• Repair concerns blame, trust, and future reduction. 

• Moral valence remains unchanged. 

 

35. Alignment-Based Motivation Principle 

Action in response to moral evaluation may be motivated by voluntary alignment with the moral horizon (BPW) rather than obligation, duty, or command. 

Clarifications: 

• Alignment is aspirational, not enforceable. 

• Lack of alignment generates no moral blame. 

 

36. Coordination Without Coercive Moralization Principle 

Collective coordination may proceed using shared evaluative language and comparative rankings without converting moral evaluation into prescriptive or coercive moral demands. 

Clarifications: 

• Coordination relies on consent and shared intent. 

• Moral disagreement does not authorize coercion. 

 

37. Moral Interface Principle 

Where direct moral evaluation is too complex for real-time decision-making, agents and institutions may rely on simplified moral interfaces (heuristics, declarations, metrics) that preserve fidelity to imposition reduction without claiming completeness. 

Clarifications: 

• Interfaces are representational tools, not moral truth itself. 

• Fidelity takes precedence over exhaustiveness. 

 

38. Directional World-Improvement Principle (BPW-Oriented) 

Agents and institutions may voluntarily evaluate actions, structures, and reforms by their tendency to move the world directionally closer to a Best Possible World characterized by conscious existence without involuntary imposition. 

Clarifications: 

• Directionality does not imply obligation. 

• Movement toward BPW does not negate present moral tragicness. 

 

39. Non-Sanctification of Action Principle 

No action, policy, or institution may be morally sanctified or declared righteous solely because it represents the least immoral available option. 

Clarifications: 

• Least-immoral status does not confer moral goodness. 

• Sanctification constitutes moral distortion. 

 

40. Voluntary Continuity Principle 

Sustained participation in imposition-reduction practices remains morally valid only insofar as participation continues to be voluntary and revocable. 

Clarifications: 

• Continuity is consent-dependent. 

• Withdrawal does not retroactively generate moral fault. 

 

 
 
41. Non-Justification of Imposition Principle 

No involuntary imposition on the will of a conscious agent may be morally justified, morally required, morally permitted, or morally sanctified by appeal to necessity, benefit, authority, rule, outcome, consent substitution, or comparative improvement. 

The occurrence, unavoidability, or comparative minimization of an involuntary imposition does not alter its moral valence. At most, comparison may identify degrees of immorality or tragic constraint, but it cannot convert imposition into moral rightness or obligation. 

Clarifications (canonical intent): 

• Moral evaluation identifies imposition as immoral wherever it occurs, without exception. 

• Necessity, emergency, or lack of alternatives does not generate moral justification. 

• “Less immoral” does not entail “morally acceptable,” “justified,” or “required.” 

• Appeals to authority, law, social order, or beneficial outcomes do not negate imposition. 

• Recognition of tragic constraint preserves moral truth rather than excusing violation. 

 

42. Applicability Without Distortion Principle (how to apply consistently in real world) 

The difficulty of consistently applying moral evaluation in real-world scenarios does not indicate a defect in the moral framework, but reflects the presence of unavoidable involuntary imposition, epistemic limitation, and moral tragedy. No increase in ease, determinacy, or procedural clarity may be achieved by reclassifying involuntary imposition as morally justified, required, or permissible. 

Where other moral systems simplify application by converting evaluation into obligation, necessity into justification, or tragedy into moral rightness, Imposition Ethics preserves moral fidelity by refusing such distortions. Consistent application therefore requires judgment, transparency, and acknowledgment of constraint rather than algorithmic action-selection or prescriptive certainty. 

Clarifications (canonical intent): 

• Moral accuracy takes precedence over ease of application. 

• Practical difficulty does not imply conceptual inconsistency. 

• Indeterminacy under constraint is a feature of moral reality, not a theoretical failure. 

• Algorithmic completeness is rejected where it would require moral laundering. 

• Real-world application may remain morally tragic even when agents act optimally under constraint. 

 

43. Emergency, Benign Uncertainty, and Extreme-Case Fidelity Principle 

Emergency situations, benign consent uncertainty, and extreme or time-constrained scenarios do not suspend, override, or simplify moral evaluation. Where involuntary imposition is unavoidable, the situation is morally tragic, and no available option becomes morally justified, required, or right by virtue of urgency, benefit, or necessity. 

In such conditions, Imposition Ethics permits comparative evaluation of available states of affairs by degree of will-frustration, without converting comparative reduction into moral permission or obligation. Agents may voluntarily act under constraint, including reliance on defeasible heuristics or intuitive judgment, but no action is morally demanded, and no coercive act is morally laundered by emergency or uncertainty. 

Benign surprises or uncertain-consent interactions are evaluated by actual will-frustration rather than the absence of prior consent alone. Where no will is frustrated, no involuntary imposition occurs; where minor frustration occurs, moral valence scales with severity without invoking prohibition or blame. 

Apparent lack of determinate guidance in extreme cases reflects moral reality rather than theoretical incompleteness. The framework preserves moral fidelity by refusing to manufacture prescriptions, permissions, or justifications where moral tragedy or epistemic limitation persists. 

Clarifications (canonical intent): 

• Emergencies do not generate moral justification or obligation. 

• “Saving someone” against their will may be less immoral, but never morally right. 

• Surprise or uncertainty does not constitute imposition absent actual will-frustration. 

• Over-caution is not required; heuristics are voluntary and defeasible. 

• Extreme cases expose moral tragedy rather than licensing moral shortcuts. 

• Moral evaluation remains descriptive even when action is urgent. 

 

44. Institutional Practical Application and Fidelity Principle 

Institutions may operationalize Imposition Ethics through voluntary structures, policies, metrics, and procedures that aim to reduce, mitigate, or make transparent involuntary imposition over time, provided that such implementation does not claim moral authority, generate moral obligations, or reclassify involuntary imposition as morally justified. 

Practical application at the institutional level consists in design orientation, not moral prescription. Institutions may employ comparative evaluation, imposition-reduction goals, exit mechanisms, appeal processes, and transparency standards as engineering tools for coordination under constraint, while fully acknowledging that institutional actions may remain morally tragic. 

Institutional practicality is achieved by preserving moral truth under constraint rather than by manufacturing moral permission, obligation, or righteousness for coercive actions undertaken for coordination, safety, or stability. 

Clarifications (canonical intent): 

• Institutions apply the framework descriptively, not authoritatively. 

• Policies may be legitimate for coordination without being morally justified. 

• Comparative reduction does not convert institutional coercion into moral rightness. 

• Transparency and acknowledgment take precedence over moral laundering. 

• Institutional effectiveness does not license moral sanctification. 

• Exit, appeal, and revision mechanisms preserve agent autonomy under constraint. 

• Failure to fully eliminate imposition reflects world conditions, not institutional moral defect. 

 

 

45. Comparative Imposition Principle 

When involuntary imposition cannot be avoided, all resulting states remain immoral; however, they are morally ranked by the degree of will-frustration imposed. 

Comparison does not convert immorality into morality. 
“Less immoral” does not mean “moral.” 

 

46. Prevention Clarification 

Preventing a future involuntary imposition is not itself an imposition when it does not override an existing will. 

Prevention, safeguards, and risk reduction are morally meaningful when they do not violate an existing will. 

 

47. Non-Goals 

Imposition Ethics does not: 

• Assign positive moral duties 

• Justify coercion 

• Aggregate outcomes to override consent 

• Excuse harm by appeal to necessity 

• Collapse moral truth into procedural governance 

 

48. Optional Prescriptive Implementation Principle (BPW-Alignment Policy)
Imposition Ethics may be implemented as a voluntary, prescriptive decision-policy for agents
and institutions who choose to align their behavior with the moral horizon (BPW). Under this
implementation, agents may treat the framework as action-guiding in the following way:

• Prefer actions that are voluntary assistance of will (consented cooperation).
• Prefer actions that avoid creating new involuntary imposition.
• Where involuntary imposition is unavoidable, prefer options that comparatively minimize
  will-frustration (least-imposition orientation), without converting that minimization into
  moral justification.

This prescriptive implementation is an adopted posture, not a moral command generated by
the framework itself. Pursuit of BPW is not an imperative, and no agent is morally required to
act, optimize, or sacrifice.

Clarifications (canonical intent):
• “Should” in this principle is conditional: it applies only within a voluntarily adopted BPW-
  alignment policy.
• No unnecessary involuntary imposition may be undertaken solely to move the world closer
  to BPW.
• BPW-oriented projects are permitted only insofar as they are themselves voluntary
  assistance and do not impose on existing wills.
• “Least imposition” guides choice under constraint, but never makes an imposition morally
  good, justified, permitted, or required.

 

Principle 49 — Kantian Imperative-Form Clarification (Categorical Classification, Hypothetical Prescription)

Statement:
Imposition Ethics issues categorical moral classifications (moral/immoral valence) but does not generate categorical imperatives (unconditional action-commands). In Kant’s terms:

• A categorical imperative commands action unconditionally (independent of any chosen end).

• A hypothetical imperative commands action conditionally (given an adopted end/policy).

Accordingly, Imposition Ethics is categorical in evaluation but hypothetical in prescription:

1. Categorical classification (unconditional valence):

   • “Involuntary imposition on a conscious will is immoral.”

   • “Voluntary assistance of will is moral.”

2. Hypothetical prescription (conditional guidance):

   • “If an agent/institution voluntarily adopts BPW-alignment (least-imposition orientation), then it should prefer voluntary assistance and, where imposition is unavoidable, choose the comparatively least-imposing available option.”

Canonical intent / safeguards:

• “Immoral” is a verdict about a state/action’s valence, not an automatically binding command on every agent.

• Any “should/must” language is policy-conditional unless explicitly marked otherwise.

• No agent is categorically required to optimize, sacrifice, or pursue BPW; BPW-alignment is an optional adopted posture, not a universal duty.
   

50. Moral Recognition, Grief, and Compassion Principle

(Comfort Without Distortion)

Where agents are involved in situations containing involuntary imposition—especially under unavoidable constraint or moral tragedy—Imposition Ethics affirms that moral recognition, compassion, and shared grief are appropriate and truth-preserving responses, provided they do not reclassify the imposition as morally justified, permitted, required, or good.

Moral comfort within the framework consists in accurately naming moral reality rather than resolving or redeeming it. Agents may be acknowledged as blameless under constraint, even when participating in outcomes with negative moral valence. Emotional support, relational repair, and communal recognition may be offered without implying moral righteousness, necessity, or obligation.

The morally fitting affective orientation to tragic situations is not pride, righteousness, or guilt-by-default, but grief, humility, and solidarity in recognition of a world that fails to fully respect will.

This principle permits consolation grounded in truth:
that the agent did not create the tragedy,
that no available option was morally good,
that moral failure of the situation does not entail moral defect of the agent,
and that acknowledgment and repair remain meaningful without altering moral valence.

Clarifications (canonical intent):

• Moral comfort must not rely on justification, sanctification, necessity, or outcome-based permission.

• Recognition that an agent acted under constraint does not convert an immoral act into a moral one.

• Compassion toward agents does not negate harm, erase moral tragedy, or dissolve responsibility for acknowledgment and repair.

• Grief is an appropriate moral response where no option avoids involuntary imposition.

• Blamelessness under constraint concerns moral blame, not moral valence.

• Communal or pastoral responses may support agents emotionally without generating obligation, absolution-by-justification, or moral authority.

• Hope within the framework is directional, oriented toward future reduction of involuntary imposition rather than redemption of past harm.

Functional Role in the Canon

This principle:

• Improves psychological and pastoral comfort without moral laundering

• Preserves honesty in tragedy

• Reinforces the valence–blame separation

• Prevents drift toward hero narratives or guilt mysticism

• Complements Principle 18 (Acknowledgment & Absolution) without expanding absolution into justification

• Supports BPW-alignment motivation without obligation

CLARIFICATIONS 

Nature can generate states with negative moral valence without being morally blameworthy. 

Lying is not inherently immoral, as no agent is obligated to use their body or speech to convey truth. 

Birth is not immoral, as no prior will exists to be imposed upon. 

All unavoidable harms remain immoral; comparison does not justify harm. 

 

 

PROVISIONAL APPENDIX v0.1 

Status: Non-Canonical / Research-Scoped / Retractable 

 

P1. STATUS OF WILL AND VOLITION 

Current science does not provide an objective, complete, evaluator-independent theory of will or volition. 

Behavioral reports, psychological models, and neural correlates may inform interpretation, but do not constitute a settled definition of what a will is, how many wills an agent has, or how wills persist across time and context. 

 

P2. Provisional Scientific Will-Model Principle

(Non‑Canonical / Research‑Scoped)

Statement: A will may be provisionally modeled as the set of stable, reflectively endorsed preferences an agent would maintain under conditions of adequate information, non‑coercion, and minimal distortion. This model is descriptive and heuristic, not metaphysical or definitive, and serves to clarify how will‑frustration may be interpreted in practical evaluation.

Canonical Intent / Safeguards:

• This model does not claim to identify the essence of will; it offers a scientifically tractable approximation for moral analysis.

• Stability refers to preferences that persist across time and context, not momentary impulses.

• Reflective endorsement refers to preferences an agent would accept upon consideration, not those produced by manipulation, coercion, or impaired cognition.

• Adequate information refers to the agent having access to relevant facts, without requiring omniscience.

• This model does not generate moral justification, obligation, or permission; it only clarifies how imposition may be interpreted.

• Where empirical evidence contradicts or refines this model, the model is revisable without altering the core axiom of Imposition Ethics.

• The model is a tool for comparative evaluation, not a determinant of moral truth.

Clarifications:

• Will‑frustration is interpreted as interference with these stable, reflectively endorsed preferences.

• Conflicting or fragmented preferences may be analyzed by identifying which preferences the agent would endorse under non‑distorted conditions.

• This model does not quantify will‑frustration; it only provides a structured basis for identifying it.

• The model is compatible with multiple scientific theories of agency, including predictive processing, preference architecture, and cognitive‑behavioral frameworks.

• Adoption of this model is voluntary and does not impose obligations on agents or institutions.
   

P2.b — Will as Agency-Relevant Choice Set 

Hypothesis: 
A will may be provisionally identified with the range of choices necessary for an agent to exercise meaningful agency. 

Status: Conceptually useful, dependent on unresolved agency theory. 

 

P3. LIMITS ON QUANTIFYING WILL-FRUSTRATION 

No scientifically grounded, non-arbitrary metric currently exists for quantifying the severity of will-frustration. 

The following may be comparatively relevant, but are not algorithmically determinative: 

• Intensity 

• Duration 

• Scope 

• Reversibility 

 

P4. HYPOTHETICAL ORDERING PRINCIPLES (NON-AGGREGATIVE) 

P4.a — Reversibility Priority Hypothesis 

Hypothesis: 
Irreversible impositions are morally worse than reversible impositions, ceteris paribus. 

P4.b — Duration Sensitivity Hypothesis 

Hypothesis: 
Longer-lasting impositions may be morally worse than shorter ones, absent countervailing factors. 

P4.c — Scope as Comparative, Not Aggregative Hypothesis 

Hypothesis: 
Scope may inform comparison but cannot override individual will-violation. 

 

P5. OVERRIDE AND PREVENTION BOUNDARIES 

P5.a — Override Threshold Hypothesis 

Hypothesis: 
An override occurs when an agent’s counterfactual choice set is reduced below the minimum required for meaningful agency. 

P5.b — Prevention Boundary Hypothesis 

Hypothesis: 
Prevention includes actions that reduce the probability of future involuntary imposition without materially constraining present choice sets. 




 

Provisional Appendix — Provisional Principles (Non-Canonical)

Status: Provisional / Non-Canonical
Scope: Optional implementation modules for agents or institutions who voluntarily adopt BPW-alignment.
Constraint: No provisional principle overrides or revises canonical principles.

P1. Positive Value Neutrality Principle

Principle (provisional):
Imposition Ethics does not define a single, universal “good,” “flourishing,” or “best life.” Positive value is treated as agent-relative: what a conscious agent, under informed and non-coerced conditions, stably endorses as desired or worthwhile.

Clarifications (provisional intent):

• The canon classifies immorality via involuntary imposition; it does not mandate a specific life-plan or value hierarchy.

• BPW-alignment (when adopted) constrains how goods may be pursued (via consent), not which goods are correct.

P2. Voluntary Motivational Grounds Principle

Principle (provisional):
Agents may have non-obligatory reasons to adopt BPW-alignment—prudential, relational, identity-based, or institutional—without those reasons constituting categorical moral requirements.

Clarifications (provisional intent):

• Typical motives may include: reducing conflict, increasing trust, stabilizing cooperation, preserving dignity, or aligning with self-identity as a non-coercive agent.

• Motivation explains why an agent might choose alignment; it does not generate a moral command to do so.

P3. Voluntary Coordination and Arbitration Principle

Principle (provisional):
Where multiple wills conflict, agents who adopt BPW-alignment may treat voluntary coordination as the primary resolution method: negotiation, trade, mediation, and pre-agreed fair procedures. If deadlock persists and imposition is unavoidable, agents may choose comparatively least-imposing options while retaining full recognition that the resulting state remains morally negative in valence.

Clarifications (provisional intent):

• Coordination tools may include: mutual compromise, rotation/time-sharing, side-payments, lotteries, neutral mediation, or contract rules chosen in advance.

• “Least-imposing” is comparative triage, not moral justification, permission, or requirement.

P4. Institutional Consent Preservation Principle

Principle (provisional):
Institutions that voluntarily adopt BPW-alignment may be evaluated by their capacity to preserve consent at scale and to reduce reliance on coercion through transparency, procedural protections, and constrained authority.

Clarifications (provisional intent):

• BPW-aligned institutional design may emphasize: meaningful exit/alternatives, due process, transparency, limited scope, auditability, and checks against concentrated power.

• Institutional legitimacy (within this module) is treated as a practical function of comparative reductions in imposed will-frustration, not moral authority.

P5. Character and Habit Development Principle

Principle (provisional):
Agents who adopt BPW-alignment may cultivate practical traits and habits that tend to reduce imposition and increase voluntary assistance of will.

Clarifications (provisional intent):

• Examples of BPW-supportive traits: consent-attunement, restraint, epistemic humility about others’ preferences, transparency, patience, and repair orientation (apology/restitution when imposition occurs).

• These traits are framed as instrumental competencies, not as a moral ranking of persons.

P6. Narrative Horizon Principle

Principle (provisional):
BPW may be treated as a moral horizon—a voluntarily chosen direction of social and personal development characterized by expanding zones of voluntary cooperation and shrinking reliance on involuntary control, without implying inevitability, obligation, or moral redemption of tragedy.

Clarifications (provisional intent):

• “Progress” within this narrative means increased consent-respecting coordination, not moral perfection or universal duty.

• Tragic cases remain tragic: reduced imposition does not convert immoral states into moral ones.

SOLUTIONS PROVIDED BY THE PRICNIPLES

1. Core Axiom (Imposition Principle)

Problem it solves:

• Utilitarianism: justifies overriding individuals for aggregate good.

• Kantian deontology: permits coercion via “rational duty” even against actual will.

• Christianity / Islam: sanctify coercion via divine authority.

What this principle fixes:
It eliminates all moral laundering mechanisms by grounding immorality in actual will-violation, not outcomes, rules, intentions, or authority.

2. Consent Principle

Problem it solves:

• Social-contract theories that treat “implicit consent” as real consent

• Religious obedience models where consent is irrelevant

Fix:
Restores voluntary participation as the sole gateway to moral permissibility.

3. Conscious Agent Principle

Problem it solves:

• Animistic, environmental, or theistic systems that moralize objects, laws, or abstractions

Fix:
Restricts moral relevance strictly to beings with wills, preventing category errors.

MORAL STRUCTURE PRINCIPLES

4. Moral Valence Principle

Problem it solves:

• Virtue ethics conflating “bad people” with “bad states”

• Legalistic systems equating wrongdoing with blame

Fix:
Separates moral reality from character judgments.

5. Moral Blame Separation Principle

Problem it solves:

• Doctrines of original sin

• Collective guilt models

• Karma systems that assign blame without agency

Fix:
Blame applies only where choice exists.

6. Nature Valence Principle

Problem it solves:

• Theodicies claiming suffering is “good” or “deserved”

• Stoic acceptance that erases moral tragedy

Fix:
Allows nature to be morally bad without moral blame, preserving honesty.

UNAVOIDABILITY & COMPARISON

7. Unavoidability Non-Justification Principle

Problem it solves:

• “No choice” defenses in law, religion, and war ethics

Fix:
Necessity never becomes morality.

8. Comparative Imposition Principle

Problem it solves:

• Binary moral systems that collapse tragic choices

• Utilitarian aggregation

Fix:
Allows ranking without justification.

9. Non-Conversion Principle

Problem it solves:

• “Least evil becomes good” reasoning

• Ends-justify-means ethics

Fix:
Prevents moral alchemy.

PREVENTION & REDUCTION

10. Prevention Without Override Principle

Problem it solves:

• Preemptive punishment doctrines

• Paternalism framed as protection

Fix:
Distinguishes risk reduction from coercion.

11–12. Directional Improvement & Reduction Priority

Problem it solves:

• Moral perfectionism

• Binary purity ethics

Fix:
Allows progress without lies.

MODAL & EXISTENTIAL PRINCIPLES

13–14. World-Dependence & Best Possible World (BPW)

Problem it solves:

• Claims that suffering is metaphysically necessary

• Religious glorification of hardship

Fix:
Preserves the conceptual coherence of a harm-free world.

AGENCY, COMMUNICATION, EXISTENCE

15. Non-Obligation of Expression Principle

Problem it solves:

• Absolute truth-telling doctrines

• Confessions under coercion

Fix:
Reclaims bodily and communicative autonomy.

16. Non-Imposition of Existence Principle

Problem it solves:

• Anti-natalist claims that birth is harm

• Religious guilt attached to existence

Fix:
No will → no imposition.

EPISTEMIC & PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLES

17. Moral Fidelity & Epistemic Humility

Problem it solves:

• Algorithmic ethics

• Divine command certainty

Fix:
Truth > completeness.

RESTORATION

18. Absolution Through Acknowledgment

Problem it solves:

• Religious absolution that erases wrongdoing

• Legal pardon conflated with moral cleansing

Fix:
Repairs blame without falsifying history.

NORMATIVITY & ACTION GUIDANCE

19–22. Non-Prescriptive Morality & Action Orientation

Problem it solves:

• The is–ought collapse

• Moral obligation as coercive demand

Fix:
Morality describes, it does not command.

20. Total Moral Tragicness Principle

Problem it solves:

• “Someone must be right” thinking

• Hero narratives in tragedy

Fix:
Names tragedy honestly.

21. Is–Ought Dissolution Principle

Problem it solves:

• Humean inference abuse

• Moral obligation mysticism

Fix:
Ends the logical error permanently.

COORDINATION & INSTITUTIONS (23–44)

Problems these collectively solve:

• Moral authoritarianism

• Institutional sanctification

• Coercive moralization

• “For your own good” governance

What they fix:
They allow coordination without moral lies, legitimacy without righteousness, and institutions without moral authority.

Key targets include:

• Theocracy

• Rule utilitarianism

• Moral legalism

FINAL INVARIANT

41–43. Non-Justification, Applicability, Emergency Fidelity

Problem it solves:

• Emergency ethics exceptions

• Wartime moral laundering

• “Extreme cases prove the rule”

Fix:
Even hell does not become holy.

 

Principle 48 (Voluntary Prescriptive Implementation) solves the problems of…

• Action-guidance ambiguity

  • Without it, the framework can rank states by imposition but can appear to lack a clear “move-selection” rule.

  • This principle supplies an opt-in decision policy: prefer voluntary assistance; if imposition is unavoidable, minimize will-frustration.

• “So what should I do?” under tragic constraints

  • In dilemmas where every available option involves harm, it provides a consistent selection rule (least-imposing) without pretending the outcome becomes “good.”

• Backdoor authoritarianism and moral mission creep

  • Prevents the slide from “BPW is best” to “therefore coercion is permitted to get there.”

  • It explicitly blocks unnecessary imposition done solely for “progress toward BPW.”

• Is–ought / normativity confusion

  • Keeps “should” conditional and non-authoritarian: If an agent or institution voluntarily adopts BPW-alignment, then they should…

  • Avoids claiming the canon itself issues categorical imperatives.

• Demandingness collapse

  • Stops the framework from being interpreted as requiring endless optimization, sacrifice, or maximization.

  • Prescriptivity becomes a chosen posture, not a universal moral requirement imposed on everyone.

• Institutional implementation gaps

  • Gives organizations a policy-ready operational rule (training/SOPs): consent-first; where coercion cannot be avoided, minimize imposition; do not rebrand tragedy as moral success.

• Conceptual drift into consequentialism

  • Guards the distinction:

    • Less imposition ≠ moral justification

    • Comparative ranking ≠ permission to impose

WHAT THIS ACHIEVES OVER OTHER SYSTEMS

• No authority worship

• No outcome worship

• No obligation mysticism

• No moral laundering

• No false certainty

• No heroic lies

Imposition Ethics is the first system that stays honest even when morality fails to save us.