Chapter 2.1: Tom’s Case for Naturalistic Morality

 

  Imagine you found a magic lamp with a djinn who will grant you a wish. What would you wish for? Money? Power? Fame? Fortune? Immortality? Cure all disease? End world hunger? World peace? What would be the most moral wish you could make?

 

What is Morality?

  When you see someone being hurt, or stolen from, or insulted do you get a gut reaction—a feeling that there is something wrong about whatever is happening? If you do, then you are experiencing the phenomenon of morality. 

Ultimately when we speak of morality, we are referring to these specific feelings we get when we see or think about certain kinds of actions. Some actions make us feel a positive feeling, which we label as moral actions. Some give us a negative feeling, which we label immoral actions. When trying to discover what morality is, we are trying to find out what causes these feelings and what, if anything, do the feelings refer to.

It is possible that these feelings are just an illusory byproduct of evolution and refer to nothing in reality independent of our imagination--like a mirage off in the distance--in which case, there is no objective morality. It is simply a subjective evolutionary inclination. But maybe, just maybe, our feelings about morality are more like our eyes. Perceiving something that is actually there—existing in reality outside of our imagination. If that is the case, then morality refers to something which is objective. 

If there is such a thing, what might it be? A God’s nature? An undiscovered law of nature? A moral particle? An abstract or platonic object? A new law of logic?  There are many possibilities it could be, as with any currently unknown phenomenon. In order to come to an answer, we must follow the evidence to try to discover the truth.

 

Subjective Morality

If morality is subjective, that means what makes something moral is simply the fact that some mind thinks it is, e.g. opinion, thoughts, feelings etc. All of the best evidence we currently have supports the subjective morality hypothesis--that morality is just a byproduct of evolution. However, I am a moral realist. Meaning, I believe in objective morality. The reason I am a moral realist is because there are indications morality may be more than just a subjective byproduct of evolution.

For example, if we were to discover other kinds of life ,such as aliens from different galaxies, or discover true artificial intelligence--will they also have some view on morality? If they do, will all the different forms of life seem to be converging on a single model of morality? If this was the case it would be good evidence morality is something more than a subjective inclination. 

If we were to create artificial intelligence or discovered similar such beings on other planets that did not evolve, and these developed without having been preprogrammed with morality, and if they happened to discover morality on their own, this would be conclusive evidence morality is not contingent on evolution. I believe it is highly likely that if/when such beings do occur, they will eventually develop a morality of their own. More importantly, I believe the morality they develop, (as well as the morality developed by all or the majority of conscious beings in the universe), will converge on a single model--just as scientific discoveries made by all of these different species will also converge on a single model. Indicating there is some deeper truth outside of just our subjective imaginations for morality--just as there is for science.

I believe both of these conditions are highly likely. That other forms of life will develop morality independently and they will all converge on a single model. Which is the reason I am a moral realist. So, even though we don’t have any conclusive evidence of objective morality today, it is worthwhile to try and figure out what this ultimate model of objective morality, (upon which all consciousness beings will converge), might be and what might ground it.

 

Objective Morality

  If morality is objective that means what makes something moral is independent of what any mind thinks or feels, e.g. a law of nature, a fact of reality, etc.

Morality is a term that is often confusing because we are very anthropocentric beings. We humans like to think of ourselves as the center of the universe. Because of this, when we ask questions like, “What is the moral thing to do?” we have a tendency to contextualize this question by comparing it to our personal limitations. This is often seen in the form of the phrase “ought implies can.” Meaning, that if something is the moral thing to do, and you are morally obligated to do it, this assumes you must be physically able to do it. I agree, it would not make much sense to call someone immoral for not doing something it is physically impossible for them to do. 

For example, using a classic moral dilemma—if you see a baby drowning a few feet away and there would be no cost to you to save it, would you be obligated to do so? We would never say a paraplegic was immoral for not saving the baby, because they are literally incapable of doing so.

That is perfectly reasonable. However, when talking about objective morality, this is a fundamental mistake we must overcome. If there is an objective morality, it would be self-contradictory to base that objective morality on subjective human limitations. Therefore, this “ought implies can” mentality is a flawed way of thinking when talking about something being objective. We need to filter out our subjective limitations, rather than use those subjective limitations as the basis to evaluate what the objective standard would be. 

The objectively moral thing is the standard that would apply to all beings of any subjective kind--including the most capable being in any given moral situation. This is what we mean by objective morality. The moral fact of the matter is independent of any subjective context. So, if you imagine the most capable being, i.e. a being that is infinitely powerful in any given moral situation—the objectively moral thing to do is the standard that being is measured against. Meaning, if the all-powerful being would be immoral if it did or did not do X, that action X is the objectively moral action.

Once we know the objectively moral actions, we can then apply the subjective limitations of any individual to know what is the best action they can do subjectively. This would obviously not be the objective moral action; it would only be the best subjective moral action that individual can take.

So, when asking the question of whether or not something is moral, we need to clarify if we are asking if something is objectively moral, i.e. moral independent of subjective limitations, or if we are asking if the action is subjectively moral, i.e. the best action an individual can do given their limitations to get as close to the objective standard as possible.

Most people usually mean the latter. However, in order to answer the question about subjective morality you first need some objective standard that you can compare to, in order to know if the action in question is getting as close to that standard as possible, or not.

So, to answer any question of whether or not something is moral you need to start with the objective standard and answer what the objectively moral action is in that situation. And only then, (once you have that objective answer), can you apply the subjective limitation of an individual to know which action they can take. This would maximize the moral outcome by getting as close to the objective standard as possible.

We can use this same analogy to understand why a God-based morality does not work. If we imagine an all-powerful being in any given moral situation and want to know what the moral action is, we could not simply say, “Whatever the being happens to do is the objectively moral thing.” Even if the being is perfectly moral and/or the grounds of morality, this answer fails because it is simply telling us the location of morality.  But it tells us nothing about the principles that describe why the action is moral. Is something moral simply because the God would do it, or would the God do it because the action is moral?

If whatever God does is the moral thing, for no other reason than the fact he does it, then morality is arbitrary. However, if a God does an action because the action itself is moral, (based on some set of criteria that defines morality), then in order to know what morality is we need to know that criteria. Knowing what the God would do might give us the answer to which action is moral. But it doesn’t tell us anything about morality itself. For that you would still need to provide the principles describing what makes that action the moral one.

Because of this, referencing God doesn’t tell us anything about morality. It is simply asserting where morality is located. It does not provide any definition of the moral principles that would tell us what the moral actions are.

This leads to a rather perplexing problem. If you can’t tell us what the moral principles are, then you must not have started with the moral principle as your basis to conclude a God was the source. So, how did the theists conclude God was the source at all? 

A serious model of morality would start with the phenomenon we observe, create principles to describe the patterns in that phenomenon, and only then try to infer based on those patterns what the ground of morality is. It seems theists are going about this entirely backwards. Starting with their conclusion and trying to make the evidence fit. 

This is the key to why secular models of morality are so much better, and preferred by the consensus of experts in the academic field of ethics, (over theistic models). Theistic models of morality usually start with their conclusion. A God or holy book which says God is the grounds of morality. Then work backwards, making up principles to fit the God.

Secular models do the opposite. They start with the observed phenomenon of morality, then try to come up with principles that accurately describe morality. Only then, they try to infer what the ground of these principles may be. The secular method is the same method science uses.

So, as any serious model does, we will start by looking at the phenomenon—the feelings we get of morality, and try to discern a pattern in these feelings which we can describe with some moral principle.

 

Moral Intuition

Would the world be better without rape? If you think it would, you are experiencing moral intuition. Our moral intuitions tell us certain actions are right and others are wrong, i.e. moral and immoral. For example, we tend to see killing for fun as immoral. But why? What is it about certain actions that makes them immoral?

The best approach to answering this question is to analyze the various kinds of moral and immoral actions to try and find some common factors that outline what the essence of morality is. We can imagine different ways the world can be, and use our moral intuitions to assess which ones are more moral than the others. And, continue comparing possible worlds, filtering out the less moral ones to try and get to the best of all possible worlds. 

You might worry the worlds we imagine might have some unforeseen consequences. But we can evaluate those worlds as well. Which would be more moral: the world we imagine with these consequences, or a world we imagine with the consequences being optional? Meaning, people can opt out of the consequences and reject them from existing in their world. Clearly, having the consequences be optional rather than forced, would be more moral. So, we can evaluate those cases as well.

 

Moral actions: saving, assisting, helping, healing, freeing, giving, self-sacrifice, protecting, etc.

Immoral actions: killing, rape, torture, slavery, theft, lying, cheating, bullying, etc.

 

Of this list, we can see some actions are contingently moral/immoral--like killing. For example, killing in self-defense, or killing to save the lives of others, is not at all the same as killing for fun. It seems like certain immoral actions can be made less immoral, or even moral, depending on their context.

However, there are some immoral actions that cannot be contextualized--like rape. There is no context in which rape is moral. Even if there were some case where rape could save the lives of many people, it would still be immoral. So, while some actions, like killing, are contingently immoral, other actions, like rape, are necessarily immoral.

What is the difference between contingent and necessary immoral actions? Let us look again at the action of killing. If you were to kill someone who wanted their life to end, then it may be moral to kill them in order to end their suffering, (such as in euthanasia/assisted suicide). Therefore, consensual killing is not immoral at all.

When we try to apply the same criteria to rape, there is a problem. Rape is by definition non-consensual. If it were to be consensual, then it would no longer be rape. The term “consensual rape” would be like the equation “1 + 1 = 5.” It is a self-contradiction. So, just as we can say is it objectively the case that 1 + 1 = 2, we can also say it is objectively the case that rape is non-consensual.

This consensual factor seems to be the difference between rape and killing. It is why one cannot ever be moral but the other can. It seems that consent is a determining factor in whether an action is contingently immoral or necessarily immoral. It seems that all necessarily immoral actions entail being, by definition, non-consensual.

Therefore, it seems we can tell the difference between contingent and necessary immoral actions by what happens when we make the action consensual. If the action is made consensual, and it becomes moral or amoral, then it is only a contingently immoral action. Whereas, if making the action consensual the action becomes self-contradictory, then such an action is necessarily immoral. When talking about objective morality, it is these necessarily immoral things we are concerned with. The contingently immoral things are only subjectively immoral to the context. So, they are not relevant to objective morality. It would be incorrect to say killing is objectively immoral.

Because we can use consent as a means to separate immoral actions into kinds, this implies consent is something that is pivotal in determining what the essence of immorality is. In fact, it seems that many, if not most immoral actions, stop being immoral if we make them consensual. We can thus conclude immorality is a non-consensual…” something.[1]”

Another important aspect of morality is discovered if we look at examples of non-consensual actions. For example, if I pick up a rock. You did not consent to my doing so, making it a non-consensual action. However, picking up a rock is clearly not immoral. Therefore, it seems consent only applies to yourself and your property. You cannot consent on behalf of someone else or something you have no say over, such as a rock. So, for something to be immoral, it has to be a non-consensual “something” that affects a person or their property, i.e. an imposition. So, immorality is an imposition on someone without their consent. 

Another consideration is that is it obviously not immoral to harm a rock. The reason for this seems to be that rocks don’t have the ability to feel. Even lacking the ability to feel, it can still be immoral to harm something, such as in the case of an unconscious person. So, it seems the fact that it is unable to feel, (because it does not have consciousness, nor the potential of being conscious), is what makes it not immoral to harm a rock. Therefore, morality seems to be in some way related to things with consciousness, or the potential to have consciousness in some respect.

By looking at the evidence of our moral intuitions and connecting all the dots, the picture it portrays I believe can be expressed by the principle: involuntary imposition of will is immoral. We can mirror the same methodology for morality to come to the conclusion: voluntary assistance of will is moral.

If this view of morality is correct, that any involuntary imposition is immoral, this has counterintuitive consequences that go against a great many of our moral intuitions. For example, if this model is correct, then killing one person to save another, or five others, would be immoral. Disciplining children without their consent would be immoral. Putting criminals in jail would be immoral. Giving a drug addict all the drugs they want would be moral. And, helping someone to commit a crime would be moral.

For a model of morality primarily based on moral intuitions, having consequences that contradict many of our moral intuitions is quite a big problem. If this were all the evidence we had for morality, we would be in a bit of a bind. However, there is still another line of evidence to look at—moral progress. Let us see if adding in the other data points from moral progress can help resolve these issues. But before we jump to moral progress, let us explore some more features of morality by looking at our moral intuitions.

Another common feature of the feelings of morality is the sense of “oughtness” we get when we see an immoral action. We feel as if the person ought not have done that. Or, if we see someone who could have done a moral action, but did not, we feel they ought to have done it. This feeling of “oughtness” is a key topic in moral discourse. Many believe this sense of “oughtness” is fundamental to morality. Therefore, if an objective morality exists, it must have some “oughtness” quality to it in order to accurately reflect these feelings about morality. 

However, I think that is incorrect. I believe our feelings of “oughtness” are not fundamental to the essence of what morality is, but rather an anthropocentric addition. In other words, it is not the “oughtness” that makes something moral. What makes something moral is something else entirely.

We can demonstrate this is the case. Is something moral because we ought do it, or ought we do it because it's moral based on some independent criteria? It seems to be the case that something is moral because it fits some set of criteria. Only after something has met those criteria, do we add the prescription that we ought, or ought not, do it. Therefore, oughtness is not intrinsic to morality but is rather a corollary addendum.

However, “oughtness” represents one of the most common features of our moral feelings. We only apply moral language to agents, e.g. that person who killed someone for no reason is immoral, but that rock which fell on someone and killed them is not immoral. The world would have been better had both actions not occurred, but we only call one of them immoral. The reason I believe this is the case, is because we only have perceived control over one of the actions. Meaning, we believe we can influence the person to not kill by creating laws, providing deterrents, teaching people social norms that guide their actions. We can do none of this to affect the actions of the rock. Therefore, this sense of “oughtness” only seems to apply to individuals who are aware of these social norms, and are intellectually capable of recognizing their action goes against them. So, an action which would be immoral for an adult human of some reasonable level of mental acuity, would not be immoral if done by a child. Or, someone who is mentally handicapped, or a lion, or a rock, because they lack the intellectual ability to understand their action goes against the social norms. 

However, this seems to go against another of our intuitions about morality--that it is supremely important. There is nothing higher than being a morally perfect being. A pacifist Buddhist monk who owns nothing but the clothes on his back is a superior person than Caesar, or Genghis Khan, or Attila the Hun, (powerful warlords who conquered half the world and could have anything they wanted). 

If morality is what is supremely important, isn’t the consequence of the person losing their life more important than who or what caused it? If that is the case, would it not make more sense for the consequence to have more moral weight than who or what caused it? It seems to me, the supremely important fact in that scenario is the death of the individual. If that’s the case, why do we call someone who died by a falling rock simply “bad”? Whereas, if a person is doing the killing, it is given the more significant label “immoral”?

The fact that a person is the one doing the killing seems almost trivial in importance in comparison to the significance of the lost life. To call someone’s death simply “bad” seems to be entirely insufficient to convey severity of the event.

 

Morally Perfect World

  I want you to imagine a Morally Perfect World. What does it look like? Is there no death, no murder, no torture, no aging, no hunger, no strife, no poverty, no disease? Is the morally perfect world the same as a perfect world? Or, is there a difference?

If you define morality as only having to do with the actions of agents, then even if all agents were perfectly moral, the world would still have death, suffering, disease, and all manner of terrible things. By this definition, a morally perfect world is nowhere near a perfect world. In fact, most of the bad things that happen are caused not by agents, but by nature. Nature kills more people every year than all human wars combined. So, defining morality to only pertain to actions of agents seems strange to me.

When I talk about objective morality, I am using that term to refer to the essence of goodness itself—the ground of all goodness. The idea that a morally perfect world would still have so much bad seems to miss the core of what morality is--as it is oblivious to many, maybe even most, of the goods and evils in the world.

For this reason, when I imagine a morally perfect world, for me, it is the same as the perfect world. Therefore, instead of defining morality as how agents should act, I define morality as the principles that describe the nature of the perfect world. Not just for actions of agents, but any actions. If you think a morally perfect world could still have billions of people suffering from disease and dying painful, natural deaths--and yet, the world could still be perfectly moral—then, I think you have an inane understanding of morality.

 

 

 

 

Criticism of Philosophy

  Unfortunately, this is how most philosophers understand morality. This is one of the primary reasons I think moral philosophy is unproductive and unrelatable for most people. Also, if you think morality only pertains to actions of agents, then there must be some other kind of “goodness” to describe all the “goods” which don’t have to do with human action. In fact, there seems to be far more of this other kind of “goodness.” So, if they are separate, this other kind of “goodness” supersedes morality by a significant margin. However, when I use the term “goodness” I don’t tend to think of it as having greater significance than morality. On the contrary, I think morality has greater significance than “goodness.”

     If our intuition about morality--that it is supremely important--is correct, then I believe it is more accurate to apply moral language to the more significant event: the death of the individual, independent of who or what caused it. Of course, this leads to the question, “Why do we only use moral language to apply to agents?” As I mentioned earlier, this seems to be due to the fact that we have some perceived control over agents--in that we can influence their actions with social norms. 

If my interpretation is correct, then if we are able to gain a similar level of influence over rocks falling on people, we would begin to see that as morally significant as well. Do we see moral intuitions shifting under certain circumstances to give us a reason to expect they may shift in this way? I believe we do. In the example of the moral progress we see across time.

 

Moral Progress

Societies tend to have shifts in their moral intuitions and beliefs over time. Some of the best examples of moral progress are; women’s rights, gender equality, LGBT rights, decreases in racism, abolition of slavery, increases in freedom of expression, decreases in capital punishment, helping the elderly, helping the mental and physically handicapped, increases in charity, human rights movement, reduction of child labor, workers’ rights, civil rights, veganism/vegetarianism, animal rights, universal healthcare, etc. Are these changes random, or is there a pattern in them across cultures--something that connects them?

There are examples of things which were culturally seen as moral becoming culturally seen as immoral. Such as certain kinds of disciplining children, like spanking—causing a child physical pain to deter them from doing certain actions. This was once seen as the moral duty of parents to make sure their children are prepared for living in the world. But as society has progressed, and a greater understanding of the psychological harm this can do to some children has been determined, and the fact there are non-violent ways to achieve the same outcome--society at large has begun to see such a method as cruel and immoral. 

There are also examples of things considered amoral becoming seen as moral. Such as, caring for the environment, (as we gain the resources to be able to live without damaging ecosystems). For example, it begins to be seen as immoral to damage the environment with pollution, or over hunting/fishing a species to extinction. Another common example is veganism/vegetarianism. In many developed nations it is becoming seen as immoral to kill animals.

We also see the opposite—things once being seen as immoral becoming moral. Such as killing the enemy in war. Or, rationing resources while prioritizing certain groups. These can begin to be seen as moral if there is a loss or limitation of the availability of resources and such actions become necessary for survival.

Each of these advances only seem to take place in extremely specific circumstances. Namely, as the society involved makes technological advancements or gains access to an abundance of resources. Societies implemented many required actions and prohibitions which were believed to be beneficial to the society in some respect. As the technological limitations of societies are removed, the old prohibitions and requirements are no longer perceived as necessary or beneficial. These begin to be questioned, causing the perception of them as being moral/immoral to begin to shift. As society gains enough excess resources to allow for more individual freedoms, without causing a detriment to the society, it appears as if we begin to allow for those freedoms to be seen as morally neutral. Whereas, if the action would be a detriment to the society by requiring resources and not producing enough in exchange to be beneficial, we would see the action as immoral.

For example, gay marriage. Because gay couples cannot produce biological children it is not as evolutionarily beneficial to a society as they still require food and other resources. So, it makes sense societies with very limited resources did not provide resources to gay couples, and would instead give the resources to heterosexual couples. This would allow for the society to survive longer giving societies who happened to demonize gay relationships an evolutionarily advantage. However, once agriculture provides an abundance of food and other resources, resulting in no detriment to the society for providing them to gay couples, societies begin to shift to being more accepting of gay relationships.

Of course, this process is slowed if there is a prominent ideology in the society which inherently demonizes such relationships. Such ideologies become prevalent because of the evolutionary advantages their doctrines provide. Their more explicit doctrines will only begin to be questioned once the less stringent required actions and restrictions lose relevance, in a similar fashion due to technological progress in other domains.

All of the examples I have provided so far involve culpable agents. But there also examples of moral progress that seem to be applying moral language to non-agents. Such as in the modern social justice community which uses morally charged terms like: racist, sexist, misogynistic, transphobic, etc., applying such terms to non-culpable individuals and non-conscious entities. For example, a system or argument can be racist without a culpable person being involved. Also, arguing that someone can be subconsciously racist without having any ill-intention. That pattern hidden in these examples is--as technology or access to resources increases, the scope of morality also increases. Starting from those of the highest social status, then eventually trickling down to those of lower social status. For example, from men in positions of authority, to men of a lower social status, to women, to animals we like, to the elderly and handicapped, to other cultures and races, to criminals, to animals of higher intelligence, to animals of lower intelligence, etc. Each of these stages being a result of the technological advance of the society. Allowing it to have excess resources, which can then be used to support the lives of those with lower social status. Doing so previously would take resources away from those of higher social standing, whom the society is perceived to depend on for its survival. Thereby, putting the society at risk. The pattern also goes in the opposite direction. Once we lose access to resources or means to sustain ourselves, the pattern reverses. Harsh environments create harsh people.

If we follow this pattern to its extreme, and imagine we had infinite resources, the scope of moral progress will continue to grow until it encompasses every conscious entity. One by one, humans would begin to feel morally compelled to provide all conscious entities with the resources they require to live, and then, additionally to live well—free from involuntary impositions.

As mentioned in the section on moral intuition, some immoral actions are only contingently immoral, and others are necessarily immoral. Moral progress tells us there are also contingent moral intuitions that were adopted for the purpose of survival, but really have nothing to do with morality. Just as contingent immoral actions are irrelevant to objective morality because they are only subjectively immoral to certain contexts, the same applies to our intuitions. If our intuitions are only subjective to specific social contexts, then they do not tell us about objective morality, and we must filter the contingent intuitions out of our consideration of determining what objective morality is.

This might just be able to solve the problems presented earlier in the proposed definition of objective morality/immorality, (involuntary imposition of will). If our intuitions in the counterintuitive examples are all contingent intuitions, then we need to filter them out of our consideration of objective morality. They are only relevant in the subjective context of our social situations and will change in accordance with new social situations. Therefore, having no bearing on objective morality.

Let us look again at the counterintuitive examples. Are these actions contingently immoral? To find out we must take moral progress to its extreme and imagine we have infinite resources, and then see if the proposed solution is moral or if there is a more moral alternative.

 

Criticisms/Objections Killing One to Save Many is Immoral 

     If we imagine we have infinite resources, killing one to save many is never the moral option because there will always be a more moral option available to us. Such as, teleporting the victims to safety. It’s only justified to kill the one because you don’t have infinite resources. So, it’s the lesser evil option. Being the lesser evil doesn’t make it moral. It’s still evil.

 

Punishing Children is Immoral

  If we imagine we have infinite resources, punishing children is never the moral option. There will always be a more moral option available to us. Such as, giving them the intellectual capabilities to recognize the implication of any action, (essentially making them adults, at which point they have the right to make choices for themselves). It is only justified to punish children, because if you don’t, they will suffer far worse consequences imposed on them by reality--if they do not learn to avoid certain actions. But again, that does not mean it is moral to punish children. Only the lesser evil done to prevent the greater harm if you do not.

 

Putting Criminals in Jail is Immoral

  If we imagine we have infinite resources, forcing a person to be in jail against their will is never the moral option. There will always be a more moral option available to us. Such as, teleporting the victims to safety or giving each person their own personal force field to protect them from criminals. It’s only justified to imprison the criminal because we don’t have infinite resources. So, it’s the lesser evil option. Being the lesser evil doesn’t make it moral. It’s still immoral.

 

Giving a Drug Addict Drugs is Moral

  If we imagine we have infinite resources, we could create a cure to any of the negative side effects of any drug. The reason it is considered immoral to give an addict the drugs they desire is because of the harsh negative consequences on their body/life. Therefore, if we can remove any such consequences, there is no reason not to give the addict the drugs he desires, (as there are no consequences). In such a case, it would actually be moral to give the drug addict the drugs. If we have infinite resources.

 

Helping Someone to Commit a Crime is Moral

  If we imagine we have infinite resources, we could create a virtual world where the person can commit as many crimes as he/she likes with no consequence to others, allowing them to fulfill their will with no consequences. Thus, it would be moral to help them commit their desired crime. If we had infinite resources. If they specifically willed to impose involuntary restrictions on someone else’s will, then it would necessarily be immoral to help them. As it would entail imposing on someone else without their consent.

 

Rocks Falling on People is Immoral

  One obvious example of this being accepted is religious and it is called “natural evils.” In Christianity, these include tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, etc. One of our biggest intuitions is of blameworthiness. How can something be immoral if it can’t be considered blameworthy, (as rocks obviously cannot)? I believe this contradicts with our intuition that morality is supremely important. 

Which is more important, the blameworthiness of the perpetrator or the consequence to the victim? I would say the impact on the victim is far more important by comparison. So, if our intuitions that morality is supremely important are correct, then the impact on the victims would be far more relevant to moral language. In which case, if we compare a rock falling on someone vs. a perpetrator deliberately killing someone, the vast majority of the moral significance is in the death of the victim, not the intentionality of the perpetrator. Therefore, we should not discount the rock falling and killing someone from having moral considerations. I believe this is the primary reason the social justice community so readily apply moral language to non-culpable entities, such as systems, arguments, and subconscious tendencies.

One of the biggest indications that we will begin to see inanimate objects as morally culpable is advances in the field of neurology. Neurology indicates we are all subject to our brain chemistry. So, no one is ultimately to blame for their actions, as there is no such thing as libertarian free will. We are all victims of our physical brain chemistry. So, there is no such thing as blameworthiness. Therefore, morality ultimately does describe non-culpable objects. Namely, chemistry and matter in motion. We know many actions we would often label immoral are not caused by the choice of an individual, but by the physical processes in their brain, such as brain tumors:

“The sudden and uncontrollable paedophilia exhibited by a 40-year-old man was caused by an egg-sized brain tumour, his doctors have told a scientific conference. And once the tumour had been removed, his sex-obsession disappeared.” [2]

 

Such facts discovered in neurology are causing a change in how we view criminality. Making it more of a medical condition in need of treatment rather than a punishable offence. I believe morality will have the same shift. We will begin to see immoral actions as actions that should be prevented, not actions done by agents who are blameworthy.

To use an example, I first heard from Sam Harris—psychopathy. We tend to see the actions of psychopaths as immoral. They do actions which actively harm others for their own benefit or pleasure and feel no remorse. Because of this we see them as bad people deserving of punishment. But imagine with future advancements in neurology, we discovered a cure for psychopathy. Where you could just take a pill and open the pathways in the brain which were impaired, allowing the individual to feel the empathy and compassion they were unable to feel before. Now, they feel the guilt and remorse for their actions. Once we get to this point, we will no longer see psychopaths as morally culpable for their actions. Rather, victims of their biology--exactly like the brain tumor.

This is not just true of brain tumors or psychopathy but all mental conditions. Once we find out any action that we perceive as immoral was caused by some curable brain state, we will no longer see it as a morally culpable action done by an evil person. Rather we will see both the perpetrator and the victim as victims of a disease. If we intend to be honest in our search for morality, we must incorporate these facts discovered in neurology and other modern scientific fields and follow the evidence wherever it leads.

Many people do this by adopting the compatibilist approach. Compatibilism being the position that free will is compatible with determinism. Meaning, even though we are determined, we can still have freewill in the sense that, insofar as our brains act without outside influence, even though our brains are wholly determined by physical and biological forces, then we are free. Others do away with morality all together as a fictitious concept relating to the myth of freewill. There is a third approach. That adopted by the social justice community I mentioned earlier, which is broadening the concept of morality to apply to things with no culpability. Such as, system, arguments, and subconscious biases.

But I take a different approach. I believe the concept of morality will evolve, much like the criminal justice system is doing now, into a more realistic understanding that incorporates advances in our knowledge of reality. For example, recognizing morality does not refer to some persons culpable choice to do good or bad, but rather their brain chemistry and whether or not it predisposes them to help or harm others. Thus, changing the concept of morality to mean something like, “Does the physical structure of that brain assist people or harm people?” This shift from seeing morality as actions done by agents, to actions done by physical brain states. is moving us a step closer to seeing inanimate objects as having moral significance.

We can then ask, if physical brain states in agents can be moral/immoral, then why not see physical states outside of agents as being able to do moral/immoral actions? Like, rocks falling on people? We can potentially make a moral comparison between physical states just as we do for brain states. This physical system is predisposed to harm wills, more than that physical system, and is thus, more immoral.

I believe this is likely to occur. So, I argue in the future, people will intuitively see morality/immorality not as actions done by agents, but any action done to agents--regardless of who or what does the action.

It seems as if these counterintuitive consequences are not so counter intuitive after all. They are simple contingent intuitions based on our current subjective circumstances. We can see the evidence of such intuitions changing, even today. In the future when our technological means progress sufficiently, these criticisms will themselves become examples of moral progress. Where a past society did not see the moral significance, the future society will.

Now that we have analyzed the evidence of morality from moral intuition, and moral progress, and have derived principles based on the patterns in each, let us build a more comprehensive model of what an objective morality will look like if we project these principles to their extreme. 

 

Contradictory Wills Objection

  If one person wills to not be alone, or for a particular person to be with them, yet the other wishes to not be with that person, in my model this will result in the person who wishes the other to be with them, to be rejected their desires and end up being alone. This seems like an involuntary imposition on the will of the person who is alone, thus being immoral or providing a contradiction in my model.

This is incorrect. The principle “no involuntary imposition of will” is not limited to “your will” but “all wills involved.” Your will only applies to yourself and your property. If you will something involving another person, for there to be no involuntary imposition of will, ALL parties involved must consent. So, if you will for another to be in your universe, and they do not consent, that is not an involuntary imposition of your will. Because your will only applies to yourself and your property and does not apply to other conscious beings. Their will applies to themselves and their property. So, if they stay in their own universe, neither yourself, they, your property, nor their property has been involuntarily imposed upon. Therefore, no involuntary imposition of will has occurred.

 

The Moral Standard

Based on moral intuition we can conclude that morality can be described with the principle “involuntary imposition of will is immoral.” Based on moral progress, we can conclude this principle extends to all conscious agents. And, the imposition we currently see as justified are all contingent on subjective limitations. Following these lines of evidence, we can conclude the objective moral standard is a world where there is no involuntary imposition of will of any conscious agents. What would such a world look like?

If we imagine having the infinite resources to accomplish this. Every conscious agent would get a universe of their own which they can design however they wish and decide all the actions that are allowed to occur in their universe. Any other such actions would be physically impossible in their universe. You may invite others to your universe, or be invited to theirs. And, they may consent to joining you if they are fully aware of all the rules you have in place and agree to them. It will also be possible to make new worlds jointly with other people. The only limitation being--you cannot create or force other conscious beings in your universe or program them with desires set by you. Once created, they would immediately get their own universe and the freedom to design it however they see fit.

In such a morally perfect world, all interactions will necessarily be consensual. If someone tries to harm you without your consent, it will be physically impossible. For example, if someone throws a cup at you it will simply pass through you like you are a ghost, unless you consent to it hitting you. In such a world, immoral actions such as rape and murder are impossible.

I call this world “The Best of all Possible Worlds” (BPW for short). This is the morally perfect world we can use as a basis to measure all actions to see if they meet the standard of this world. If an action would not be allowed in this world, then it is objectively immoral. To know the objectively moral action for any given situation, we would imagine the same situation occurring in the BPW. Whatever would be expected of us in that case would be the objectively moral action.   

If anyone can design their universe as they choose, will moral actions even be possible as anyone can simply snap their fingers to achieve anything they desire in their universe? Yes, though they will be more about relationships. For example, if someone desires companionship or company, spending time with them in their universe or inviting them to yours, will be moral actions. As you are voluntarily assisting them to achieve their wills—the definition of a moral action.

Let us see how this model addresses the classical moral dilemma of the trolley problem. If there is a trolley heading down a track toward five people, and you are at a switch which can change the direction of the trolley to a second track; however, there is one person standing on the second track, and you will hit them instead, should you flip the switch?

Assuming none of the persons involved consented to being hit by a train, this entire situation would be impossible in the BPW. Any of the individuals being hit by the train, without their consent, would be immoral. Therefore, we know, no matter what we choose in our realistic world, an immoral action will occur either way. To resolve this, we must consider what action we can take to bring us as close as possible to the BPW, given our limitations. If we do nothing, five immoral actions will occur as the five individuals are hit by the train. If you flip the switch, only one immoral action will occur. In this case it is reasonable to flip the switch to save the five, even if you kill the one, as you have prevented a net four immoral actions--getting as close the BPW as possible given your limitations. However, there is another consideration to remember: culpability. In the case you flipped the switch and saved four lives, you have done four moral actions which you take credit for. However, you have also done one immoral action which is also partially your fault and you should be obligated to try to accommodate the victim or their family. If you had done nothing, five immoral actions would have occurred. However, none of which you are responsible for as the physical environment itself and the moving trolley is to blame. This is why you are only partially to blame for the one immoral action caused by flipping the switch. The vast majority of the culpability lies in the physical environment of the trolley, (which is not your fault).

However, consider a similar example. If instead of there being a switch to change the direction of the trolley, there was a very fat man standing in front of the track. And, if you pushed him onto the track, it would cause him to be hit by the trolley, stopping it and saving the five. In this case, you would almost entirely be responsible for the death of the fat man. The culpability being mostly on you, rather than the trolley. Therefore, in this case it would be wrong of you to push the fat man. Whereas, it is not, for you to flip the switch. This illustrates that justification for doing an action, which will lead to an immoral outcome, is based on culpability. If the majority of the culpability is not on you, and you are simply mitigating already immoral circumstance, then such an action is a justified immoral action. This can also be called a subjectively moral action. As it is the best you can do given your limitations. However, if the majority of the culpability is on you, then it is an unjustified immoral action. In other words, both objectively and subjectively immoral.

At the beginning of my opening, I asked a question: Imagine you found a magic lamp with a djinni who will grant you a wish, what would be the most moral wish you could make? My answer to this question would be to wish for the djinni to create The Best of all Possible Worlds as I have described it. Where every conscious being gets their own universe, they can design however they like. And, it is physically impossible to force any conscious being to do anything they do not consent to doing.

If you feel this answer is more moral than the answer you came up with when you began reading, or you feel this answer is a good contender for what the most moral wish would be, then I have done my job.

This provides us a fairly comprehensive model to contrast actions with, in order to determine if they are moral or immoral. But it does not answer the last question about morality—what grounds morality? What is the ontology of morality/what is it made of?

 

Moral Ontology

  Ontology of morality: we have intuitions that are separate from moral intuitions. Like the intuition that is A = B, and B = C, therefore A = C. Nothing can be completely green and completely blue at the same time. These are also intuitions like moral intuitions.

Logic and math are languages to describe our intuitions about these fields. We also have similar intuitions about morality. So, the field of morality is analogous to the field of math and logic. Math and logic are languages humans invented to describe patterns of how reality operates. In other words, logic and math describe some feature of reality akin to a law of nature. I believe morality also describes some feature of reality--a moral law of nature.

If we understand morality in the way which I have proposed, what could possibly ground such a thing? Obviously, the BPW does not exist as anything more than an abstract ideal, (as there are clearly many involuntary impositions of will all around us every day). But it does not need to exist to act as a ground. A perfect triangle is an object with three perfectly straight lines, each with an adjoining angle of 60 degrees. In our world, it is impossible to draw a perfect triangle. As an example, when we use an electron microscope to zoom in on the lines, we will see they are never perfectly straight as the electrons move in rounded bubble shapes. However, we can still use the non-existent abstract idea of a perfect triangle to get as close as possible given our limitations. We can do the same with the BPW, even though it also does not exist.

However, there is something that does exist which is leading us to this abstract ideal. As I mentioned before, I believe that all conscious agents will develop morality independently from one another, including non-evolutionary consciousnesses. In addition, they will all converge on a singular model of morality. If this is true, then there is something inherent to all minds causing this phenomenon.

Such properties commonly resulting among diverse groups are referred to as higher order emergent properties. Some other example of higher order emergent properties are health and fitness. Fitness is the ability for an organism to survive in an environment. Some organisms are more fit than others, as they can survive/thrive in more and harsher environments. Is fitness objective? Yes, it is an objective higher order emergent phenomenon describing a relation between an organism and environment in which it can live-- which is true independent of minds or opinion.

Is there a highest level of fitness, like an objective standard to compare the fitness of other creatures? Yes, it is possible for an organism to be capable of surviving in any environment. Thus, making it the objective standard of fitness. We know of no such organism, but we can use the abstract ideal as a guide in determining the level of fitness of any given organism.

Morality is a higher order emergent property like fitness. But instead of measuring the relation between an organism and its ability to survive in an environment, morality measures some relation between an environment and consciousness and the entities interactions within these. Or, in the case of my model, the ability for conscious entities to act without involuntary imposition of will in any given environment.

Why call this higher order phenomenon morality when we could just call it something different? Remember, ultimately morality is whatever is causing those feelings we have when we see certain actions, we call moral or immoral. Whatever is causing those feelings and what those feeling refer to is morality. If such a higher order emergent property exists, it would explain why we have the moral intuitions and progress we observe and why such things are also present in all conscious agents. Therefore, this definition seems to exactly map onto what we are referring to when we are talking about morality. 

We can go one step further. This higher order emergent property view of morality can be seen as an undiscovered law of nature, i.e. the moral law. This law can be ultimately grounded in Naturalistic Pantheism—the position that the fundamental nature of reality is unguided natural processes, i.e. not a mind or non-physical consciousness. Value, meaning, purpose, etc., can also be naturalistically grounded in similar way.

In order try and make Naturalistic Pantheism into something those who believe in a God can relate to and/or understand, we can describe it in terms of God’s properties. A theistic God is usually described as having the properties: eternal (or outside of spacetime/the first mover), all-powerful (or necessary), all-good, all knowing, personal, conscious being. If you remove “personal” you get a deistic God which is eternal, all-powerful, all-good, all knowing, and conscious being. You can think of Naturalistic Pantheism as removing all the conscious aspects leaving only eternal, (or outside of spacetime/the first mover), all-powerful (or necessary) nature. Or put simply—Naturalistic Pantheism is eternal, all-powerful nature.

This can act as a ground for objective morality in a similar way theists believe God does. Objective morality, the undiscovered law of nature, is a part of the nature of Naturalistic Pantheism. So, just as a God can be said to ground objective morality, Atheistic models of reality can also ground objective morality and are far better by comparison.

​